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Executive Summary
We live in the second age of monopoly power. A small number of firms hold significant 
market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across 
the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. And yet, the 
antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when 
they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their 
ability to foster competitive markets. 
This report roots this problem in the structure of the antitrust laws and agencies and offers 
an agenda for reform. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies 
make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. 
Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of non-expert, unaccountable judges – 
set much of antitrust policy. This report provides a set of recommendations to take antitrust 
away from the courts – to restructure the antitrust laws and agencies in order to enhance 
the government’s ability to enforce antitrust laws more effectively and more transparently. 
Recommendations:
 1 Reinvent the FTC as a new Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA)
 2  Eliminate Duplicative Merger Review Authority
 3 Require Transparency, Participation, and Justification for Merger Approvals
 4 Institute Retrospective Review of Mergers
 5 Transform the Bureau of Economics into a Bureau of Investigations and Research
 6 Create an Office of Competition Advocate
 7 Expand Third Party Enforcement
 8 Restrict Conduct and Conditional Enforcement Remedies
 9 Require the Small Business Administration to Consider Competition Policies
 10 Advocate for Competition Policy Abroad
 11 Require All Agencies to Incorporate Anti-Monopoly Considerations in their Decisions
 12 Empower the States to Review Mega-Mergers
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Introduction: The Second Age of Monopoly Power
We live in a second age of monopoly power. The first age, which spanned from the 
Gilded Age of the late 19th century through the Progressive Era in the early 20th century 
was marked by the growth of corporations into “trusts.” From 1894 to 1904, hundreds 
of corporations disappeared as the “Great Merger Movement” led to consolidation and 
concentration in many sectors of the economy.1 Decried in the general public, the trusts 
were caricatured as octopuses with tentacles extending across sectors of the economy 
and into government. 
In response to the first age of monopoly power, Americans across party lines rallied to 
fight the trusts and monopolies that threatened freedom and democracy. Republican 
John Sherman of Pennsylvania authored the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and was 
joined by the Republican “Trustbuster” Teddy Roosevelt in seeking to rein in powerful 
corporations. Democrat Woodrow Wilson signed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, supported by advocate and later Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis. Right and left, Americans of that era understood that massive economic 
concentration was a threat not just to a free and competitive marketplace, but a threat 
to our constitutional democracy. As Theodore Roosevelt put it, “There can be no real 
political democracy unless there is something approaching an economic democracy.”
In recent years, we have entered a second era of monopoly power, with growing 
concentration across sectors of the economy. Four airlines now control 80 percent of 
the market.2 Three drug stores control 99 percent of the market.3 Four beef companies 
control 85 percent of the market.4 The Fortune 100 now makes up nearly 50 percent of 
GDP, with the top 20 firms capturing more than 20 percent.5 
Commentators across the ideological spectrum have noticed and criticized America’s 
monopoly problem: from progressives like Joe Stiglitz and neoliberals like Bloomberg’s 
“There can be no real political democracy unless there is 
something approaching an economic democracy.”
Theodore Roosevelt
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Noah Smith to conservative Breitbart columnist Virgil and establishment centrists at 
the Brookings Institution and The Economist.6 Even Congress has gotten involved, 
with members of the House creating an Antitrust Caucus and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee holding hearings on the question of the goals of antitrust. 
There is widespread interest in corporate consolidation because the concentration of 
economic power is a threat not just to the American economy but also to freedom and 
democracy. Economically, monopolists have the ability to hold consumers hostage, raise 
prices on goods and services, and deliver worse quality goods and services – which is 
especially problematic when their goods or services are essential in a modern economy. 
Rising concentration also contributes to widening inequality. As mega-corporations 
use their market power to squeeze suppliers and consumers to gain higher profits, those 
benefits accrue to their executives and shareholders, most of whom are on the wealthier 
side of the population.7 Some economists have shown that growing concentration is 
leading to inter-firm inequality and with it, increased inequality in society.8 Others 
have found that concentrated markets lead to lower wages.9 The rise of monopolies 
also threatens America’s innovative and entrepreneurial status. Powerful companies 
don’t want competition and are likely to use their market (and political power) to stop, 
delay, or otherwise prevent disruptive innovators from gaining traction. In recent years, 
economic researchers have confirmed this: not only is the rate of new companies 
plummeting across sector and geographies, but consolidation is an important factor 
contributing to the decline in new business formation.10 
Economic power is also a danger because it turns into political power.11 Mega-
corporations are able to contribute to candidates, lobby legislators and regulators, 
dominate trade associations, hold cities hostage for economic giveways, and shape 
the law to favor their interests at the expense of everyone else. Unlike small businesses 
or ordinary individuals, mega-corporations have the resources to hire lobbyists to rig 
the law in their favor – gaining tax breaks, creating regulatory loopholes, and watering 
down campaign finance restrictions. When laws and regulations are created to rein 
them in, they can hire armies of lawyers to fight the government in court – sometimes 
for years – in order to delay or reverse sensible checks on their power. And even if they 
lose in court, they can still hire thousands of lawyers to help them exploit every loophole 
and ambiguity, something smaller businesses and individuals simply can’t do.  
Why has growing concentration been allowed to take place? After all, America has a 
long tradition of anti-monopoly activism, and we have important institutions – the 
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Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department – that are tasked with preventing 
the growth of monopolies. The answer comes down to two things: ideology and the 
structure of the antitrust agencies. 
The first failure was one of ideology. America had a robust anti-monopoly philosophy 
from the founding of the country through the mid-20th century. But starting in 
the 1970s, a group of professors – largely lawyers and economists – adopted a new 
ideological approach to antitrust. They argued that bigness was not the problem, 
that antitrust had nothing to do with political freedom, and that the only thing that 
mattered in antitrust law was consumer welfare. As a result, they focused antitrust law 
on reducing consumer prices and increasing economic efficiency, even if that meant 
allowing mega-mergers to create vertically and horizontally-integrated behemoths 
that had more power than most governments. Their prescriptions for antitrust law and 
policy were also largely rooted in economic theory, rather than empirical facts and 
data. For example, in a wide-ranging lookback at mergers over the last few decades, 
economist John Kwoka has shown that permissive merger policies have led to an 
increase in consumer prices, even though the antitrust agencies predicted a decline or 
at least no increase in prices.12 Finally as antitrust became the province of technocratic 
economists, it became more and more narrowly circumscribed within the FTC and 
Justice Department. 
The second failure was the structure of government agencies. Compared to how most 
of the rest of government works, antitrust is exceptional. Normally, Congress passes 
laws commanding agencies to act to regulate – the EPA regulates clean air and water, 
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration regulates safety in cars 
and trucks, the Consumer Products Safety Commission regulates children’s toys. These 
agencies are staffed with experts in the field, they hire scientists and commission 
studies, and they are designed to receive input from industry and the general public. 
Agencies are empowered to use their considerable expertise to make regulations 
setting standards or regulating specific practices. Courts are able to review the agency’s 
regulations, and they generally give deference to the substance of the regulation as long 
as it is within the agency’s discretion and so long as the agency has used its expertise to 
come to a reasoned decision. If a court strikes down an agency’s regulation for failing to 
consider an aspect of the problem or acting outside their statutory authority, the agency 
has a chance to correct its failure.  
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Antitrust doesn’t work this way. At first, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 
order to make monopolization and monopolists’ practices illegal. The law was written 
with extremely broad language, and the Supreme Court narrowed the law, declaring 
that only unreasonable market practices were covered by the statute. In response, 
Congress passed new antitrust laws, created an antitrust agency (the FTC), and 
empowered the FTC to interpret its charter and make rules. But in practice, a timid FTC 
has failed to take up its congressionally-authorized role and has largely abandoned the 
project of making regulations to interpret and enforce the antitrust laws it administers.13 
This has left the Supreme Court to define the substance of antitrust law. This is a 
serious problem. Agencies have considerable expertise and are politically accountable 
to Congress and the President. In contrast, the Court is made up of unelected, 
unaccountable judges who have no expertise in business realities or any specific 
sector of the economy. Worse still, the FTC now defers so completely to the Supreme 
Court’s policymaking choices that it has narrowed its own statutory authorities to 
align with judicially-invented policies. Judicial lawmaking in this arena also ties back 
to the ideology problem. Normally, the courts provide a check on regulatory agencies, 
which utilize their expertise and have a transparent process for making regulations. In 
antitrust, because the courts have no expertise, they rely on the parties in the case and 
academics to teach them about markets and competition through an ad-hoc process 
of allowing amicus briefs during litigation.14 A skewed set of intellectual inputs, and 
limited public participation, leads to judicial lawmaking that is disconnected from the 
reality of the economy.
Antitrust is also exceptional because it is split between two primary agencies, the FTC 
and the Department of Justice, and a host of secondary sector-based agencies. Both 
agencies have power to review proposed mergers. But the division of sectors hasn’t 
been set by statute and is frequently the subject of turf wars between the agencies. This 
division means duplicative costs, inconsistencies in the application of the law, and 
confusion in the merger clearance process.15 In theory, division could mean competition 
A timid FTC has failed to take up its congressionally-
authorized role and has largely abandoned the 
project of making regulations to interpret and 
enforce the antitrust laws it administers.
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and a higher standard of enforcement. In practice, it has meant the opposite: weaker 
enforcement and ineffective administration.
At the same time, because power is diffused across courts, a multimember FTC, and 
the Department of Justice, it is harder to mobilize in order to hold the regulators 
and enforcers accountable when they fail to address anticompetitive behavior in the 
marketplace. When power is diffused across so many actors, no single actor is truly 
empowered to take action, and it is also less clear to the general public who to organize 
against and hold accountable when actions fall short. 
Ideological and structural failures have left antitrust enforcers vulnerable to the rise of 
the most important industry of the twenty-first century: technology platforms. While 
new technologies can often seem unprecedented, antimonopoly legal tools are in fact 
surprisingly versatile. One of the problems of taking an economic theory approach to 
antitrust law is that it obscures how sectors of the economy work in practice. Fighting 
monopolies requires understanding their business models and operations – not in 
theory, but in practice. Companies like Amazon, Google, Facebook, and others are 
not completely new and unprecedented in their business practices, structures, and 
motivations. But without truly understanding how they actually operate, economic 
theorists, and regulators who adopt their theories, can miss how tech companies might 
run afoul of antimonopoly principles.16 
Reversing the second age of monopoly power requires a complete re-thinking of both 
what antimonopoly law should achieve and how it should be enforced. This includes 
reforming the ideology that drives antimonopoly policy and the substance of the laws, 
as well as rethinking the structure of antitrust agencies and the role of other arms of 
government in promoting antimonopoly policy. There is an emerging body of work on 
the substance of antitrust laws, but little thought has been given to how the structure 
of antitrust policymaking and enforcement should change. Even the best antitrust laws 
will fail if we do not reverse the unaccountable and diffuse system of implementation 
and enforcement. 
Even the best antitrust laws will fail if we do not 
reverse the unaccountable and diffuse system of 
implementation and enforcement. 
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This report offers a blueprint for reforming the structural aspects of antitrust lawmaking. 
The central philosophy behind these reforms is to replace the common-law, court-
centered process of making antitrust policy with a politically-accountable process that 
relies on expertise and transparent, reasoned decision-making through an agency. 
Taking antitrust away from the courts means reforming the structure of the antitrust 
agencies and clarifying the authorities those agencies have. Power and accountability 
should be aligned, as is the case in most other parts of the Executive Branch, and the 
agency that makes competition policy should have both the authority to act and should 
be held more readily accountable for its actions.
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RECOMMENDATION 1 
End Antitrust Exceptionalism: Reinvent the  
FTC as a newly empowered and accountable  
Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA)
For more than a century, antitrust has largely been a court-centered enterprise in which 
judges take a “common law” approach to defining violations of antitrust laws. While 
the court-centric approach does have the benefit of partial insulation from politics, it is 
also insulated from democratic practice. Court-driven antitrust policy is problematic for 
a variety of reasons: (1) the courts have imposed extralegal concepts largely from one 
ideologically motivated wing of economics onto the field as a whole, (2) the courts are 
not supposed to be economic policymakers, and (3) the courts are not very accountable 
or responsive to the people. In contrast, under the traditional model of policymaking, 
which occurs in virtually every other area of regulation, Congress delegates power to the 
Executive Branch to establish regulations while using its expertise and following fair and 
transparent procedures. 
On its face, the FTC looks like a variety of other agencies. It consists of a multimember 
commission, whose members are independent of the president; it has rulemaking 
authority; and it executes a variety of statutes. But it also shares power with the 
Department of Justice, often doesn’t exercise its rulemaking powers, and has a variety 
of carve outs in its powers that cripple its ability to address all sectors of the economy 
swiftly and effectively. In order to make the FTC more similar to a traditional federal 
department or agency – and in the process, to shift power away from non-expert judges 
as the primary expositor of the substance of antitrust policy – it is essential to revise the 
agency’s management structure to align power and responsibility; to endow the agency 
with strong rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement authority and clarify the reach 
of its jurisdiction; and to remove unnecessary constraints on the agency’s rulemaking 
process that inhibit the agency’s ability to operate efficiently. 
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First, power and accountability. One of the best ways to align power and accountability 
within an agency is to restructure the FTC into a new Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA), 
with a single director rather than a multimember commission. Some might argue that 
the problems with the FTC have not been due to it being a multimember commission 
and that there is no reason, therefore, to start fresh with a revised agency structure. But 
the problems with multimember commissions, the FTC among them, are legion: (1) It is 
almost impossible to have a majority of active, aggressive regulators on the commission 
for any length of time, given compromise in the appointments process, (2) Minority 
commissioners often write dissents that legitimize opposition to regulations and can act 
as a guide or roadmap for parties to challenge the decision and for ideological judges 
who want to strike down those regulations, and (3) Politicians manipulate the slots 
available on the commissions for partisan purposes. Taken together, a multimember 
competition agency is a roadmap for inaction and delay, weak regulations, and 
ultimately ex post reversal of those weak regulations. 
In contrast, single director agencies that are accountable to the President have 
significant benefits: (1) They unify power, thereby empowering an active and energetic 
director to undertake serious actions, (2) They unify responsibility and accountability, 
creating a focal point for organizing the opposition against a failing or ideological 
director, (3) As with other agencies (e.g. EPA), active directors will push the ball forward 
significantly, while regressive directors will only be able to take limited action to 
undermine policy – due to the stickiness of policy and industry adaptation to new rules. 
To the extent that the commission structure has been beneficial in recent decades (e.g. 
in minority commissioners exposing the bad policies of the majority to journalists and 
the public), this is a function of an era in which competition law was in desuetude. As 
we move into an era in which competition law needs to be defined and enforced more 
aggressively, this feature is outweighed by the significant benefits of having an agency 
that is capable of acting swiftly and effectively.
Second, rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement authority. Currently, the courts explicate 
the meaning the antitrust laws on a case-by-case basis. In virtually all other areas of law, 
however, politically accountable and expert agencies are in the driver’s seat – making 
regulations that execute on Congress’s wishes, with accountability coming after the fact 
from the courts. To align with the traditional administrative model, the new AMA should 
be granted rulemaking power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in addition to its 
currently underused authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act, so that the agency 
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can define and specify civil violations of these canonical antitrust laws. For example, the 
agency could set per se rules and presumptions through the ordinary rulemaking process. 
As is conventional under administrative law, the courts would grant Chevron deference 
to rules made pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment 
procedures. Although this grant of rulemaking power is only strictly necessary under the 
current regime if the courts block agency actions under the act, granting the AMA these 
powers preemptively and explicitly would give the agency greater flexibility. 
In addition, the FTC Act should be revised to clarify that the AMA would have 
jurisdiction to regulate the unfair competition practices of common carriers, airlines, 
and packers and stockyards. The common carrier provision, for example, has been so 
broadly interpreted that a recent Ninth Circuit decision even held that the FTC cannot 
regulate AT&T’s non-common-carrier-services because the firm as a whole is, in part, a 
common carrier.17 The decision was overturned by the entire Ninth Circuit, but making 
the AMA’s power clear would be wise. This clarification also has bipartisan support from 
Democratic and Republican FTC commissioners and from the Heritage Foundation.18 
The AMA’s enforcement powers should also be clarified in order to make it conform to 
more traditional agency principles. The agency should, like other supervisory agencies, 
have an inspections power to accomplish its supervisory goals. In addition, the agency 
should be able to bring civil enforcement claims to administrative law judges, who should 
have the power to order damages for violations of the antitrust laws. These decisions 
would, as in other areas of regulatory enforcement, be appealable to the federal courts. 
Finally, normalizing antitrust policymaking under the AMA requires repealing some 
unnecessary requirements that have burdened the FTC – in particular, the Magnuson-
Moss constraints on consumer protection rulemakings. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 
the FTC has to go above and beyond the standard notice-and-comment process for 
rulemaking and include a variety of trial-like procedures, including oral hearings and 
cross-examination. On average, when the FTC has been forced to use the Magnuson-
In virtually all other areas of law, however, politically 
accountable and expert agencies are in the 
driver’s seat – making regulations that execute on 
Congress’s wishes, with accountability coming after 
the fact from the courts. 
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Moss procedures, it takes the agency more than five years to issue rules. In contrast, the 
average time for the agency to issue rules under ordinary APA procedures is around 
290 days.19 This is an extraordinary delay, one that cripples the agency’s ability to act in 
a dynamic economy. In line with making the AMA follow ordinary administrative law 
principles, these provisions should be repealed.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) The FTC should be relaunched as a new agency, the Anti-Monopoly Agency (AMA), 
which would be headed by a single director, appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate and protected from political influence through 
restrictions on their removal. The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts (and other 
legislation under the FTC’s purview) would move to the AMA. The Department of 
Justice would retain criminal prosecution authority and backup civil authority.
(B) The AMA should have the power to make rules and regulations to specify and define 
violations of the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and any other competition statute. The 
AMA’s interpretations of those statutes shall be granted Chevron deference by a 
reviewing court. 
(C) The AMA would continue as the nation’s primary consumer protection agency. 
Sector-based agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Department of Transportation would retain their authorities, but Section 5(a)(2) 
of the FTC Act (15 USC §45(a)(2)) would be revised to eliminate the exceptions for 
common carriers, packers and stockyards, and airlines.
(D) 15 USC §57a, which establishes onerous procedures for FTC rulemaking on 
consumer protection issues, under the Magnuson-Moss Act, should be repealed, 
leaving the agency to make rules under traditional APA procedures.
(E) The AMA would be granted inspection authority to inspect the books and records 
and management practices of companies with revenues greater than $1 billion 
without suspicion of wrongdoing to deter anticompetitive conduct.
(F) The AMA should the have the authority, after notice and hearing, to order restitution 
and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains for civil violations of the antitrust laws.
(G) The AMA should be insulated from the political process of Congressional 
appropriations. Like the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the AMA should be granted powers to assess reasonable 
fees for supervision and merger approval. 
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RECOMMENDATION 2 
Eliminate Duplicative Merger Review Authority
The FTC currently splits its authority over pre-merger approvals with the Department 
of Justice. The conventional argument for splitting authority is that it creates regulatory 
competition, which, in theory, might be beneficial. But in practice, the theory has not 
been borne out. First, while divided authority has led to some competition between the 
agencies for review, it has also led to significant delays. In some cases, the agencies take 
up more than half of the pre-merger review time period (30 days) determining which 
agency has the power to review the merger, leaving the agency with little time to conduct 
a robust review.20 Second, the division of merger authority is by sector. This arbitrary 
division was determined based on convention and negotiations between the two agencies 
rather than by statutory authority. The result has been duplicative costs, inconsistencies 
in the application of the law, and confusion in the merger clearance process.21 A better 
approach is for a single agency – the AMA – to have all pre-merger approval powers, 
thereby making the agency responsible for all aspects of competition policy. 
While pre-merger approval powers would be a change from the status quo, enforcement 
powers could remain divided, as in conventional in other agencies, like the SEC. Both 
the AMA and the DOJ would have power to bring civil cases, but the DOJ alone would 
have power to bring criminal cases.22 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) All pre-merger reviews should be conducted by the AMA.
(B) The DOJ would retain criminal investigations and prosecutions authorities, initiated 
on its own and to criminal investigations and prosecutions referred to it by the AMA, 
and it would retain backup civil enforcement authority.
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RECOMMENDATION 3 
Require Transparency, Participation, and 
Justification for Mega-Mergers
Unlike mergers of banks or telecommunications companies, for the majority of 
big corporations, mergers do not require affirmative consent from their chartering 
authorities or federal competition regulators. Instead, enforcement agencies must 
threaten time-consuming litigation taking into account severe resource constraints. 
This has the effect of biasing market outcomes toward consolidation. In addition, 
when the FTC or DOJ passively approve a merger, they offer no reasoned explanation, 
even if there is significant public outcry. This passive approval process makes it hard 
to understand why mergers are approved and hard to understand retrospectively if 
the antitrust agencies’ ex ante assumptions and analysis of the likely consequences of 
mergers were accurate. In the extremely limited number of cases when FTC and DOJ do 
object to a merger, under the current system, they find themselves in court litigating the 
merger disapproval in front of judges with no expertise on the matter. 
As part of making the AMA more akin to an ordinary regulatory agency, merger 
approvals should be subject to a more transparent and participatory regime. Any 
merger involving a company with more than 1,000 employees, that has a significant 
market capitalization ($1 billion), or that impacts sectors of significant public concern, 
should have to be affirmatively justified with an open period for public comment 
and participation. This comment period would allow stakeholders, employees, 
and competitors, in addition to members of the general public, to weigh in on the 
desirability of the merger and the likely consequences of the merger. The AMA would 
then have to consider the public’s comments, in addition to the information it has 
at its disposal, and write a decision approving or disapproving of the merger. This 
written record will in turn be used to hold the agency accountable for its decision: 
First, commenters and interested parties can challenge the agency’s reasoning under 
the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard (for either approving or disapproving of 
Merger approvals should be subject to a more 
transparent and participatory regime. 
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the merger). Second, this written record will facilitate the agency’s ability to conduct 
retrospective reviews of its mergers (see below), in order to learn from its successes 
and failures. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The AMA shall have the sole authority to approve mergers, and all qualified mergers 
must be affirmatively approved as mergers within the public interest. 
• Definition of a qualified merger: Any merger (a) in which either party has a market 
capitalization above $1 billion, (b) in which either party has 1,000 or more employees, 
or (c) which the agency determines is critical to the health, safety, or national security 
of Americans.
• Public Comment Period: For any qualified merger, there shall be a public comment 
period of no less than 60 days in which the AMA shall solicit and collect comments 
from the general public as to whether the merger should go through, akin to the 
notice and comment process under the APA.
 • Documentation: The AMA will present an administrative record of facts and  
 arguments considered (with appropriate redactions) as justification for its  
 approval/disapproval of the merger.
 • Consideration of Comments: The AMA must consider comments in approving  
 a merger and must, in its approval, provide a concise and general statement of  
 the justifications for the merger, including addressing any counterarguments  
 made in the comments. 
 • Review of AMA decision: Commenters shall be able to challenge the AMA’s  
 approval in court if the AMA has inadequately addressed the comments. Courts  
 shall review the AMA’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
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RECOMMENDATION 4 
Institute Retrospective Review of Mergers
Over the past forty years, one of the problems with antitrust law and policy is that it 
has relied inordinately on abstract economic theory rather than empirical reality. This 
is problematic because the benefits and drawbacks of mergers (and of competition 
policies more generally) might not accord with the academic theories of economists. 
Indeed, recent empirical research on post-merger approvals has shown that the antitrust 
agencies have largely failed even on their own terms of achieving lower prices.23 
The AMA should look backwards at its merger approvals and determine whether their 
ex ante analysis of mergers has been successful. Retrospective review will help the AMA 
learn from empirical evidence and modify its behavior accordingly over time.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The AMA shall conduct retrospective analysis of all qualified mergers 5 years after the 
merger, in order to assess whether the merger actually led to decreased concentration in 
the market, more competition, and lower prices. The retrospective analysis should also 
assess whether the AMA’s predictions used to approve the merger were borne out. The 
AMA’s reports shall be delivered to Congress and made publicly available.
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RECOMMENDATION 5 
Transform the Bureau of Economics into a Bureau 
of Investigations and Research (BIR)
How do we know if an industry is overly concentrated? How do we know where 
exclusionary and anticompetitive practices are taking place? In the early 20th century, 
the answer was simple: the FTC conducted industry-wide investigations.24 These were 
in-depth investigations using the FTC’s section 6b powers to identify and expose 
competitive and market power problems in industry. These investigations could then 
lead to prosecutions for illegal practices. Over time, however, the FTC’s investigative 
mission has atrophied. Today, the FTC’s competition work is largely supported by 
economists, rather than a broader group of diverse professionals needed to conduct 
industry-specific investigations.
The AMA should reinvigorate its investigatory and research capacities by replacing the 
Bureau of Economics with a much broader Bureau of Investigations and Research that 
will be composed of a variety of personnel with the professional skillsets and expertise 
necessary to conduct effective industry-wide investigations. These investigations will 
not only inform merger approvals (as the BIR will know a great deal about industries 
in which mergers are taking place) but also the enforcement of both competition and 
consumer law.
The BIR would also be tasked with conducting retrospective reviews, rather than the 
office that approves mergers. Although there is some loss of expertise in dividing 
approvals and retrospective review, the purpose of separating retrospective reviews is to 
enhance the independence of the review in order to prevent the natural human-need to 
justify and defend past actions.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Bureau of Economics should be transformed into new Bureau of Investigations and 
Research.
• Authorities: The BIR will (1) conduct investigations under FTC section 6b and its new 
inspection powers, and write reports on industry practices, (2) conduct retrospective 
reviews as provided for above, and (3) provide support to the Bureaus of Competition 
and Consumer Protection when requested. 
• Composition: The BIR shall be composed of a diverse group of employees, including 
lawyers, investigators, accountants, data scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
historians, economists, engineers, technologists, and any others whose training 
might be relevant for investigatory purposes. No more than 20% of the BIR’s full time 
employees, part time employees, or consultants shall come from any one discipline. 
The head of BIR shall have experience in investigations.
	 ©	2018				|				GREATDEMOCRACYINITIATIVE.ORG 20
RECOMMENDATION 6 
Create an Office of Competition Advocate
Not all knowledge lies with experts, and particularly with experts in government. 
Knowledge is often diffuse, held by members of the general public. This is perhaps 
especially true when it comes to knowledge about uncompetitive behavior in a large and 
diverse economy. Experts in government are often drawn from similar communities 
as the entities they regulate, which means they might have a limited perspective. While 
the Bureau of Investigations and Research can conduct independent investigations 
into particular sectors of the economy, the BIR might not always know about the most 
pressing or the most cutting-edge sectors in which an investigation might be necessary. 
The AMA and DOJ can prosecute bad behavior but they might not know where all of the 
bad behavior is. Members of the general public affected by uncompetitive practices, in 
contrast, might have that knowledge.
The AMA should, as a result, have an Office of Competition Advocate, which would 
be tasked with taking complaints from the general public and channeling that diffuse 
public knowledge into forms that the AMA can use. First, the Competition Advocate 
would maintain a complaint hotline, in order to assist the AMA in its enforcement 
mission on both unfair competition consumer practices. Data from the hotline will be 
public, so that it can be analyzed by independent scholars. To prevent abuse, fraudulent 
complaints will be punishable by a fine. In addition, the Competition Advocate 
would work with other agencies throughout the government to identify possible 
anticompetitive practices from data collected by those agencies. 
Second, members of the general public would have the ability to petition the 
competition advocate with information about an area that is ripe for a BIR investigation. 
The Competition Advocate would sift through the information and write a report on 
the comments. The BIR will be able to use the report to identify areas that are worthy 
of a full investigation. This process has a variety of benefits. Not only does it provide 
an additional way for the BIR to gain information from the general public, but it also 
engages the general public through a participatory process. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
There should be an Office of Competition Advocate (OCA) within the AMA. The 
competition advocate will take complaints from the general public regarding 
competition and market power problems in industry, including accepting petitions for 
BIR investigations that come from the general public. 
• Complaints: The OCA will maintain a complaint hotline and keep a database on 
complaints about unfair competition practices. The data from this database shall be 
made public, and fraudulent complaints shall be punishable by a fine. In addition, 
the OCA will write an annual report summarizing and analyzing trends and issues 
raised by complaints, including making recommendations to the AMA based on the 
complaints. In addition, the OCA should be empowered to contact and learn from 
community groups and state attorneys general. 
• Petitions for Investigations: Members of the general public can petition the OCA to 
recommend that the BIR investigate a particular sector. Each year, the OCA will write 
a report summarizing the comments received, and it will recommend areas that are 
particularly worthy of investigation. 
	 ©	2018				|				GREATDEMOCRACYINITIATIVE.ORG 22
RECOMMENDATION 7 
Expand Third Party Enforcement
Federal agencies have limited resources. This means that they frequently have to make 
choices about which entities to investigate and against which entities to enforce the 
law. The result, however, is the underenforcement of law. In response, Congress has 
frequently given state attorneys general and even private citizens the power to enforce 
the laws. Under current law, state attorneys general do not have the authority to enforce 
violations of the Clayton Act’s provisions on price discrimination, exclusive dealing and 
tying, and interlocking directorates (among other things). Expanding state AG power 
to include these elements will help ensure that the law is enforced even if the AMA and 
DOJ are unwilling or unable to enforce it to its fullest extent.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
State Attorneys General should be able to enforce certain Clayton Act provisions: 




Restrict Conduct and Conditional Enforcement 
Remedies and Ensure Full Enforcement of the 
Antitrust Laws
The DOJ and FTC frequently use conduct and conditional remedies instead of banning 
mergers outright. The idea is that a merger can still go through if the merging entities 
agree to a set of conditions that will prevent anticompetitive harms from taking 
place. While the theory of conduct and conditional remedies is promising, scholars 
have shown empirically that conduct and conditional remedies are at a minimum 
ineffectual and at worst counterproductive.25 In cases where the antitrust agencies 
have used conduct and conditional remedies, prices have sometimes actually gone up 
after mergers. The ban on conduct and condition remedies could be implemented by 
executive order, by the agencies themselves voluntarily, or by statute. 
Furthermore, in 2015, the FTC issued a statement of enforcement principles that severely 
restricts its own enforcement powers, in contravention of legislative intent. It limits 
enforcement to cases of consumer welfare, conflates section 5 of the FTC Act with the 
rule of reason, and appears to suggest the FTC has limited discretion to bring challenges 
under the FTC Act. This document should be disavowed explicitly, so that the AMA is 
clear that it must act in accordance with the broader goals of antitrust, that section 5 
of the FTC Act is broader than the rule of reason, and that the agency has discretion to 
challenge practices under the FTC Act, Sherman, and Clayton Acts.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) The Department of Justice and AMA should be directed not to use conduct  
and conditional remedies.




Require the Small Business Administration to 
Consider Competition Policies
Surprisingly, the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy is not tasked with 
advocacy on competition and concentration within the United States Government, 
despite the obvious interest of small businesses in maintaining a competitive economy 
and preventing economic concentration. Currently, the Office of Advocacy is tasked 
with measuring the costs of regulations and making proposals to deregulate, when 
such actions would be in the interest of small businesses. But regulations have benefits, 
not just costs, and many regulations might help small businesses, particularly if they 
preserve competition, prevent economic concentration, or expand access to goods 
and services. The laws directing the office of advocacy’s efforts, however, ignore this 
possibility. This should be changed. 
In addition, the Office of Advocacy has not been directed to evaluate the impact of 
consolidation within industries in the economy on small businesses, provide comments 
to the FTC and DOJ on the likely harms to small businesses from mergers, and provide 
comments to agencies on the impact on small businesses of rules that might lead to 
consolidation in industry. The office should be empowered to do so because such 
advocacy could be helpful to small businesses. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(A) Require, in 15 U.S.C. §643b(3), the SBA office of advocacy to measure the benefits of 
regulation and the impact of the failure to regulate on small businesses, and require 
the office to make proposals for regulations that help small businesses. 
(B) Empower, in 15 U.S.C. §643b, the SBA to evaluate the impact of consolidation within 
industries in the economy on small businesses, provide comments to the AMA on the 
likely harms to small businesses from mergers, and provide comments to agencies on 
the impact on small businesses of rules that might lead to consolidation in industry.
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RECOMMENDATION 10 
Advocate for Competition Policy Abroad
After World War II, the United States engaged in a historic effort to rebuild Europe and 
Japan through the Marshall Plan. While the story of the Marshall Plan is well known, what 
is less commonly understood is that the United States exported aggressive antitrust laws 
to Europe during those post-war years. The Marshall Plan antitrust advisors believed that 
the massive consolidation in the German economy facilitated and sustained fascism, and 
they argued that a democratic society required a democratic economy.26 Today, in the 
context of increasing concentration, rising authoritarianism, and foreign governments 
commingling state and markets through state-owned enterprises and state capitalism, 
promoting economic democracy abroad should be an essential foreign policy objective. 
And yet, the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement designed by the 
Obama Administration, established the objectives of competition policy as “economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare,” a narrowly drawn and ideological conception of the 
purposes of antitrust law that has no basis in U.S. statutory law.27 Presidents and their 
administrations should abandon these cramped views of antitrust and instead encourage 
the adoption of more aggressive antitrust laws abroad.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Trade Representative should advocate for aggressive and expansive anti-
monopoly standards and practices in its trade agreements and international negotiations. 
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RECOMMENDATION 11 
Require All Agencies to Incorporate Anti-Monopoly 
Considerations in their Decisions
During his final year in office, President Obama issued an important executive order 
requiring agencies to identify and use authorities to promote competition.28 This 
executive order was a big step forward in pushing departments and agencies to think 
about anti-monopoly policies. But a new executive order, or a statute, could go further 
and require that in any rulemaking or major guidance document, any department 
or agency must consider the impact of the policy on consolidation and competition. 
Agencies are already required to consider the impact of regulations on federalism, 
paperwork burdens, and small businesses; adding the impact on consolidation 
and competition might help build anti-monopoly thinking into the agencies’ DNA. 
In addition, agencies should consider concentration and competition in making 
contracting and procurement decisions, so that the agencies can facilitate competition 
instead of furthering concentration.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Agencies should be required, by executive order or statute, to consider the impact of 
rulemakings and major guidance on consolidation and competition, and to include 
anti-monopoly considerations in their contracting and procurement decisions.
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RECOMMENDATION 12 
Empower the States to Review Mega-Mergers
Historically, corporate charters were granted by legislatures. The reasoning was that the 
advancement of limited liability and shared investor capital would foster innovation, 
trade, and economic activity. But today, too many states make the formation of 
corporations nothing more than a formality. In the absence of corporate chartering at 
the federal level, states must play their role in ensuring that the pursuits of corporate 
profit remain aligned with broader public purposes and economic competition.
In addition to affirmative approval by the AMA, the relevant state of incorporation 
should establish conditions on charters that incorporate antitrust goals. This serves as an 
important check on whether the corporation is seeking to expand for purposes aligned 
with the public interest. 
Of course, this could lead to the loosening of standards for some states seeking to 
be friendly to corporations. To prevent a race to the bottom, the AMA should outline 
minimum standards that chartering agencies should adhere to. Every five years, the AMA 
should publish a report on state compliance with these standards. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
• States should establish standards for corporate charters that incorporate antitrust goals.
• The AMA should establish minimum standards as guidance for states on how to 
include antitrust goals as part of corporate chartering, and it should publish a report 
evaluating the states every five years.
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